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Introduction 
 
Writing a supranational history of the EEC 
 
 
The first four years of the European Community’s existence were conspicuously 
successful.  Between 1958 and 1962, the six founding member states demonstrated  
an ability to implement and even go beyond their original treaty bargain which 
surprised and delighted those who negotiated the Treaty of Rome.1  The new 
institutions appeared to function.  By 1962 the European Commission had seemingly 
overcome its teething problems and had shown itself to be a fertile source of policy 
proposals and a skilful advocate of Community advance.2  The early track record of 
the Council of Ministers, meanwhile, had underlined that even without the generalised 
use of majority voting that was due to begin in 1966 wide-ranging consensus could be 
effectively and rapidly built between six governmental representatives.  The European 
Court of Justice seemed intent on continuing that process of forming a far-reaching 
body of European jurisprudence that had been the hall-mark of its operation within 
1 See e.g. Robert Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie. Mémoires 1911-1986 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1986), 
pp. 304-321 
2 On the teething problems, see Robert Lemaignen, L’Europe au berceau. Souvenirs d’un technocrate 
(Paris: Plon, 1964).  For an overall assessment, N. Piers Ludlow, ‘A Supranational Icarus: The 
European Commission and the Quest for Independent Political Role’ in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Inside 
the European Community: Actors and Policies in European Integration from the Rome Treaties to the 
Creation of the “Snake” (1958-1972) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming) 
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the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).3  And even the European 
Parliamentary Assembly – the Cinderella institution in terms of power and influence 
under the original treaty-rules – had shown an energy and a commitment to both its 
own development and the wider advance of European integration that made it unlikely 
that its comparative powerlessness would continue indefinitely.  Its 1962 decision to 
call itself the ‘European Parliament’ rather than its treaty-given name – and the way in 
which this altered title was generally accepted by all but the French – said much about 
both its ambition and the chances of some of its aspirations being realised.4 
 The emergence of common policies was also further advanced than many had 
expected.  The clearest example of initial expectations being exceeded was the 1960 
decision taken by the Six to ‘accelerate’ the timetable for creating a customs union set 
out in the Treaty of Rome.5  This meant that both the establishment of tariff-free trade 
amongst the Six and the creation of a uniform tariff towards the outside world were 
likely to be completed substantially before the January 1, 1970 deadline originally 
agreed.  Similar encouragement could be drawn from the way in which the Six had by 
1961 managed to agree on all of those problematical tariff positions left undefined in 
the original Treaty – the so-called ‘List G’.6  But perhaps still more striking for those 
3 Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, ‘Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Integrationsfaktor’ 
in Ernst von Caemmerer, Probleme des Europäischen Rechts (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966); 
Stuart Scheingold, The Rule of Law in European Integration. The Path of the Schuman Plan (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) 
4 Le Monde, 1-2.4.1962 
5 Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-63 (Princeton University Press, 1964), 
pp.253-262; Hans von der Groeben, Combat pour l'Europe. La construction de la Communauté 
européenne de 1958 à 1966 (Brussels: CECA-CEE-CEEA, 1984), p.110 
6 von der Groeben, Combat pour l'Europe, p.61 
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observing the EEC’s early steps was the way in which a European agricultural policy 
did appear likely to emerge.  The 1950s discussions about agricultural cooperation on 
a European scale had seemingly shown that the evident desire of several European 
countries to promote European agricultural integration co-existed with a formidable 
and possibly insurmountable range of obstacles.7  There had thus been many who had 
believed that those articles of the Treaty of Rome stipulating that the new body should 
have a European agricultural policy would remain as purely paper pledges. However, 
the landmark decisions of January 1962, defining the basic shape and manner of 
operation of the common agricultural policy (CAP), indicated that within the EEC 
progress towards a ‘green Europe’ might be smoother and quicker than the 1950s 
precedent had appeared to suggest.8  In particular, the way in which an effective pro-
CAP alliance between the French, the Dutch and the European Commission had been 
able to overcome the hesitations of the West Germans and Italians, established a 
pattern of advance that if repeated might see a working agricultural policy established 
simultaneously with the planned customs union.  Little wonder then, that when 
looking back at this initial surge of institutional and policy success, the European 
Commissioner Robert Marjolin should describe the 1958-1962 period as ‘the 
honeymoon years’.9 
 International reactions to the early integration process had also been highly 
encouraging.   That the United States government had been supportive should perhaps 
7 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 224-317; 
Gilbert Noël, Du Pool Vert à la Politique Agricole Commune.  Les tentatives de Communauté agricole 
européenne entre 1945 et 1955 (Paris: Economica, 1988) 
8 Ann-Christina Knudsen, ‘Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical 
Study’.  PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2001 
9 Marjolin, Le Travail d’une Vie, p.304 
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not have come as a total surprise.  Ever since 1947 Washington had championed the 
idea of European unity, primarily for cold war reasons.10  Nevertheless, the closeness 
and warmth of the rapport built up between Walter Hallstein’s European Commission  
and the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations was both remarkable and, in the 
context of a superpower dominated world, extremely valuable.11  The wave of US 
academics who descended upon the Brussels of the late 1950s and early 1960s to 
describe in immensely (and excessively) favourable terms the process of 
transformation underway was also indicative of positive US sentiments towards the 
early EEC.12  And US goodwill was more than matched by the almost unseemly rush 
amongst other Western-leaning countries to establish ties with the nascent 
Community.  Within two years of the EEC’s establishment, Greece, Turkey, Israel 
and Lebanon had all begun negotiations with the Community with a view to 
establishing some type of privileged relationship, while countless other countries had 
set up representative offices and missions in Brussels so as to be able better to observe 
and influence the process underway amongst the Six.  In 1961 outside attention had 
become even more flattering, if potentially disruptive, with requests for membership 
submitted by Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway.13  Not all of those involved with 
the Brussels experiment were entirely pleased that such applications had arrived at so 
10 Geir Lundestad, Empire by Integration: the United States and European Integration 1945-1997 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
11 Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (London: Macmillan, 
1993) 
12 See Jonathan P.J. White, ‘Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC 
Commission’, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 9, no. 1, 2003, pp.111-131 
13 Alan S. Milward & Anne Deighton (eds.), Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European 
Economic Community, 1957-1963 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999) 
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early a stage of the Community’s development, but it was undeniable that, as Sicco 
Mansholt, another of the first Commissioners, put it, ‘we can view the British, Danish 
and Irish membership applications as proof of the success of our Community’.14   
 Such success was all the more notable, and welcome, for coming at a time 
when other political developments seemed only to confirm Europe’s reduced status in 
global affairs.  For the French the 1958 to 1962 period was dominated by the latter 
stages of the Algerian trauma: the collapse of the IV Republic in 1958, precipitated 
primarily by events in North Africa, was followed by the fraught attempts to extricate 
France from the bloody colonial war and by the wave of bitterness and internal strife 
that this ‘retreat’ provoked – bitterness encapsulated most prominently by the multiple 
attempts to assassinate General de Gaulle.15  For Germany, meanwhile, the repeated 
crises over Berlin in 1958-9 and then again in 1961 only served to underline its 
vulnerability as a front-line state in the cold war, its dependency on the goodwill of its 
alliance partners, and its fear of being the victim of a settlement struck behind its back 
by the US and the Soviet Union.16  The building of the Wall in 1961 did bring a 
stability of sorts, but only by quite literally setting in stone the postwar division of the 
country.  And, for all of Europe, the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 seemed to epitomise 
the continent’s relative powerlessness.  During the  confrontation all of the Six had 
risked annihilation and yet had none had had either privileged information about or 
any influence over the course of American policy.  Instead, they had been mere 
spectators as the US President determined the Western response to the most 
14Débats de l'Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne 1961-2, vol.II, p.78 
15 Matthew Connelley, A diplomatic revolution : Algeria's fight for independence and the origins of the 
post-cold war era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.215 ff. 
16 Rolf Steineger, Der Mauerbau : die Westmächte und Adenauer in der Berlinkrise 1958-1963 
(München: Olzog, 2001) 
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dangerous crisis of the cold war.17  For countries that had grown accustomed to 
considering themselves as at the centre of world affairs, this was a difficult state of 
affairs to accept.   Against such a gloomy backdrop, European integration was not 
merely a welcome success story, but also a process which might, in the medium term 
at least, begin to redress the imbalance of power that had existed since 1945. 
 Despite four years of successful operation, however, the Community of 1962 
had not yet advanced far towards answering the two crucial questions, implicit in, but 
unanswered by, the Treaty of Rome.  The first of these was that of ‘what the 
Community should do’: in other words, which policy areas the integration process 
should the Six initially concentrate on.  The second was that of ‘how the Community 
should operate’.  This centred on the institutional make-up of the EEC.  On neither 
did the Treaty of Rome provide a complete answer.  In terms of the EEC’s policy 
agenda, the Rome Treaty was very much a ‘traité cadre’ – a framework document that 
provided the mechanisms for cooperation but left up to later decision-makers the 
choice of what policies should flank the basic customs union.  Agriculture, transport 
and social policy were all referred to briefly as possible areas of common activity, but 
for none were the details or the timetable of progress spelt out.  And on institutional 
matters the Treaty text was equally open.  Some of its provisions and some of its 
vocabulary seemed to suggest a direct line of descent from the avowedly federal 
Schuman Plan of 1950.  There was thus plenty of scope for those eager to see the 
rapid establishment of a fully united Europe to press ahead with their ambitions.  But 
other aspects of the Treaty seemed, by contrast, to show the extent to which Europe’s 
leaders had retreated from the federalist mechanisms of the early 1950s.  In both 
powers and name, the European Commission was hence very different from the High 
17 Maurice Vaïsse (ed.), L’Europe et la crise de Cuba (Paris: Plon, 1993) 
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Authority of the ECSC.  Likewise, the EEC Council of Ministers had a centrality 
within the institutional make-up which underlined how far it had come since being a 
belated Benelux addition to French ideas in 1950. 
 To these two initial unanswered questions a third had then been added by the 
approach of the British, Irish, Danes and Norwegians in 1961, namely that of ‘who 
should participate in the Community’.  Here too the EEC’s founding charter offered 
little precise guidance.  There was a treaty article – number 237 – which set out the 
mechanism by which a membership application might be received.   The treaty 
preamble furthermore spoke of the Community being open to all European states.  But 
no details were given as to when these applications might occur, what criteria, if any, 
should be used to decide which applications were acceptable, and how the EEC might 
avoid its internal progress being seriously disrupted by the eagerness of new states to 
join the process.  The ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘whom’ of early integration were all equally 
undefined. 
 At the very beginning of the integration process this degree of ambiguity had 
been a positive asset.   The openness with regard to the Community’s agenda had 
allowed each member state to hope that its preferred areas of joint activity would 
flourish whereas those cooperative ideas with which it had little sympathy would 
remain on the drawing board.  The Italians had thus envisaged a Community with a 
much greater ‘social policy’ dimension than the Germans; the French and the Dutch 
had thought in terms of a much more extensive (and expensive) agricultural policy 
than had the Germans or the Italians.  In similar fashion, the multiple institutional 
aspirations compatible with the basic treaty text had allowed the widest possible range 
of pro-Europeans to support the setting up of the EEC.  Within the broad coalition that 
had rallied behind the Treaty of Rome were committed federalists, certain that only a 
 8 
truly united Europe would suffice and confident that this would be the eventual 
outcome of the integration process, and partisans of a much more cautious 
intergovernmental approach.  Many of the latter had just as much faith that the 
institutional balance created by the Treaty of Rome would evolve in ‘their’ direction 
as had the federalists.  And even the uncertainty over the exact membership of the 
EEC had allowed the co-existence within the early Community of many of those who 
had been most enthusiastic about the British-led plans for an eighteen-member 
European free trade area alongside partisans of a smaller, tighter and exclusively 
continental grouping.18  The ability of so many different strands of opinion to cohere 
together behind the institutions of the Community was one of the key reasons that the 
Six had all been able to attain the necessary parliamentary backing to ratify the Treaty 
of Rome. 
 As the Community developed, however, it was inevitable that some of those 
who held these divergent beliefs would begin to realise that their hopes were likely to 
be frustrated.  A Community that existed could not hope to be all things to all people 
in quite the same way as one that had yet to emerge.  And, as this happened, the latent 
disagreements about the policy agenda, the institutional balance and the membership 
of the EEC were bound to come out into the open.   After May 1958 this was all the 
more likely to happen because of General de Gaulle’s return to power in France.  On 
all three of the crucial questions, the new French leader was suspected of having 
radically different views from the majority of his European counterparts.  He was also 
known to aspire to a world role for Europe which differed markedly from that of the 
18 Contrast Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats inachevées: De l’espoir aux déceptions (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 
pp.73-100 & Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers, Rebâtir l’Europe (Paris: Duculot, 1989) 
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prevailing Atlanticist consensus.19  His re-emergence as Prime Minister and then 
President of France – the country that had hitherto exercised the greatest influence, 
both positive and negative, over the integration process – was therefore a source of 
significant concern across Europe.20 
 For his first four years in power, de Gaulle had, however, confounded those 
who had predicted an immediate clash.  Rather than rejecting his predecessors’ 
European commitments, he had instead reformed the French economy, thereby 
allowing the country to honour its Treaty commitments much more completely than 
the leaders of IV Republic France themselves had expected to do.21  And far from 
casting off all supranational shackles and proclaiming France’s total freedom from 
external constraints, he had actually pushed energetically for a common agricultural 
policy that was as binding on Community member states as was possible and which 
gave considerable powers of initiative and oversight to the European Commission.22  
Gaullist France seemed as committed to the Community game as any of its partners.   
There were, admittedly, periodic rhetorical outbursts that gave rise to some 
concern.  The most celebrated of these – that of May 15, 1962 – prompted several 
ministers to resign from the French government.23  And there were those who 
19 Roger Massip, De Gaulle et l’Europe (Paris: Flammarion, 1963) 
20 Reiner Marcowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle 1958 bis 1969 
(München: Oldenbourg, 1996), pp.11-36 
21 Raymond Poidevin, ‘De Gaulle et l’Europe en 1958’ in Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son 
siècle (Paris: Plon, 1992), vol. 5, pp.79-87; Jean-Marc Boegner, ‘1958, le général de Gaulle et 
l’acceptation du traité de Rome’, Espoir, no. 87 (1992), pp.28-36 
22 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur: the Political Economy of French 
European Policy, 1958-1970’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2000), pp.3-43 
23 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages (Paris: Plon, 1970) vol. 3, pp.404-9 
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believed that the French President’s ambition to create a political Europe to place 
alongside the economic Europe being constructed in Brussels was no more than a 
Machiavellian ploy to subvert the integration process.24  But even on this issue, the 
fact that de Gaulle allowed the Fouchet Plan to be blocked by two states as small as 
Holland and Belgium could have been construed as a sign of playing by the European 
rules rather than trying to tear them up.25  Whether through the weakness that arose 
from leading a coalition government, a total concentration on Algeria, or a 
disinclination to upset a process from which his country drew tangible benefits, the 
General seemed unwilling to turn his verbal sallies into an assault on the realities of 
integration as practised in Brussels.  The Gaullist challenge appeared to be no more 
than a paper-tiger. 
 All of this changed dramatically in January 1963.  The French veto of British 
membership – announced in the famous press conference of January 14 - marked the 
moment when de Gaulle’s divergences of view from his Community partners ceased 
simply being theoretical and became an immediate danger.  At the same time, the veto 
also marked the transition from Marjolin’s ‘honeymoon years’ to the ‘time of 
crises’.26  And it is on these crises – and the Community’s painful recovery from each 
of them – that this book is intended to focus.  It is hence a study of the most traumatic 
period in the EEC’s early development rather than its most successful. 
 In part this focus reflects a belief that it is at moments of crisis that the nature 
of a political system like the early EEC can best be perceived.  During the 1958-1962 
24 Oliver Bange, The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict 
(London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.25-29 
25 Pierre Gerbet, ‘The Fouchet Plan negotiations 1960-2’ in Roy Pryce (ed.), Dynamics of Political 
Union (London: Routledge, 1987), pp.105-129 
26 Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie, pp.322-353 
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period the Community’s forward momentum was so irresistible that even many of 
those who harboured doubts about the integration process chose to remain silent.  
Similarly, with success following on from success, the effort that had gone into each 
was at times all but concealed.  In the later period, by contrast, not only did the 
divisions that the pursuit of greater integration caused emerge more clearly, but the 
efforts needed to push that process forward became that much more evident and hence 
easier to analyse.  Both the dynamics driving supranational Europe onwards and the 
forces holding it back are as result easier to dissect at a time when they were closely 
balanced than during one where only the pressures for integration were clearly 
apparent. 
 The concentration on the years of crisis is also, however, a result of the fact 
that the clash between de Gaulle and his partners over the nature of the Community is 
frequently referred to by EC/EU experts, but seldom understood.  Several of the 
episodes which this book will assess in detail – like the empty chair crisis or the 
Luxembourg compromise of January 1966 – have assumed near mythical importance 
in the version of history most often referred to in Community circles and amongst 
those academics who work on the current EU.27  They have become seen as the key 
moments when the Community dream went awry, a process of downfall that only the 
equally  mythological rebirth of the 1980s was able to undo.  And yet such assertions 
are nearly always made without the benefit of any detailed study of the later 1960s 
themselves.  The myth has thus long-since ceased to bear much resemblance to 
historical reality. 
27 A typical and recent rendition of the Community’s own view of its history is Bino Olivi, L’Europa 
difficile.  Storia politica della Communità europea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995) also published in French 
as L’Europe difficile. Histoire politique de la Communauté Européenne (Paris: Gallimard, 1998) 
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 Thanks to the fact that most Western European archives exercise a thirty year 
rule and hence release hitherto secret papers after three decades have elapsed, the 
myth is now ripe for correction.  Rather than relying on the well-rehearsed account 
which describes the way in which de Gaulle was able to strip the Community of 
virtually all of its dynamism, thereby condemning it, from the mid-1960s until the 
mid-1980s, to nearly two decades of frustration, this study will use archival 
documents to demonstrate that the reality of the Community’s development during the 
1963-9 period is both more complicated and more important than the standard history 
would suggest.  For not only did de Gaulle not ‘win’, but the period in question also 
witnessed the emergence and consolidation of an institutional system that would 
function throughout the next decades.  Indeed, significant features of it are still with 
us today.  Revealing what happened to the EEC in the course of the 1960s is thus 
more than a matter of simple historical interest.  Instead it is a vital part of 
understanding how the Community system was created and, therefore, why crucial 
parts of it function as they do at present.  Such comprehension is necessary for any 
one seeking to analyse the current system, let alone those who seek to reform its 
future operation.  A better understanding of how the EC/EU emerged may, in other 
words, make at least a small contribution to the debate currently underway about 
where it should go. 
 The task of demythologising the recent past by means of newly released 
archival documents is of course a familiar one to any contemporary historian. Where 
this book will diverge from the norm, however, is in its attempt at the archival 
reconstruction of a supranational system.  Most contemporary history remains 
resolutely national in its approach.  Multiple archives are often employed, but they 
tend to be those of different government ministries, different private interest groups, 
 13 
or different individuals, all acting within the same national sphere.  And this has 
remained true of the majority of efforts so far devoted to the origins and early 
development of European integration.  A range of books and articles thus explore 
German industry and the integration process, Italy and early European agricultural 
integration, or France and the plans for European political union.28  Similarly, the rich 
profusion of edited volumes devoted to the postwar emergence of European unity, 
tend to be organised around chapters on the Netherlands, Italy, France, Britain, 
Denmark and so on.29 
 There have admittedly been some historians who have attempted to transcend 
the purely national framework.  Alan Milward’s important studies on the pre-1958 
development of European integration did deploy a wide range of different countries’ 
records, albeit grouped most often in national case-studies rather than combined 
28 Thomas Rhenisch, Europäische Integration und industrielles Interesse.  Die deutsche Industrie und 
die Gründung der EWG (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999); Giuliana Laschi, L'agricoltura italiana 
e l'integrazione europea (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2000); Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘Le Général de Gaulle, le 
Plan Fouchet et l’Europe’, Commentaire, 13/2, 1990.  The same single country approach characterises 
the best recent political science analysis of early European integration: Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea 
of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
29 See Franz Knipping & Josef Becker (eds.), Power in Europe: Britain, France, Italy and Germany in 
a Postwar World 1945-1950 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986); Ennio di Nolfo (ed.), Power in 
Europe? vol. II: Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC, 1952-1957 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992); Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schumans-Plan 1950 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988); Enrico Serra (ed.), The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989); Milward & Deighton (eds.), Widening, Deepening and Acceleration; 
Wilfried Loth, Crises and Compromises: the European Project 1963-1969 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2001) and Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European 
Institutions, 1948-1963 (London: Macmillan, 1995) 
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together to form a single, continuous strand of pan-European analysis.30  Likewise a 
number of American scholars have sought to take a multi-country approach to recent 
European history.31  In this fashion they have been following the example set by those 
like Marc Trachtenberg who have tried to trace the evolution of the cold war in 
Europe using archives in a variety of European countries.32  And there have been a 
series of Italian historians who have turned the inadequacies of their own national 
archives into a spur for writing truly multinational history.33   There has also been a 
sizeable sub-genre dedicated to bilateral relationships in postwar Western Europe.  
That between France and Germany has understandably been the most 
30 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (London: Methuen, 1984); ibid., 
The European Rescue of the Nation-State & ibid. (ed.), The Frontier of National Sovereignty.  History 
and Theory 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993) 
31 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (New York: University of Cornell Press, 1998) &  ibid., ‘De Gaulle Between Grain and 
Grandeur: the political economy of French European policy, 1958-1970’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 
2/2, 2000; Jeffrey Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the 
Reorganisation of Western Europe, 1955-63 (Chapel Hill: University of Virginia Press, 2002).  Much 
less impressive, although ostensibly multinational in focus is John Gillingham, European Integration, 
1950-2003. Superstate or New Market Economy? (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
32 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement 1945-1963 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 
33 Antonio Varsori, Il patto di Bruxelles (1948): tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica (Roma: 
Bonacci, 1988); Massimiliano Guderzo, Interesse nazionale e responsabilità globale.  Gli Stati Uniti, 
l'Alleanza Atlantica e l'integrazione europea 1963-9 (Firenze: Aida, 2000); Maria Eleonora Guasconi, 
L’Europa tra continuità e cambiamento. Il vertice dell’Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione 
europea (Florence: Edizioni Polistampa, 2004) 
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comprehensively studied, but there have been attempts to apply the same technique to 
Anglo-German, Anglo-French, Franco-Italian and even Dutch-German relations.34    
 Few of these studies, however, have really come to terms with the fact that, 
from 1958 onwards, national actors within a European context shared some of their 
power with supranational institutions and exercised their influence collectively as well 
as singly.  This means that the development of the EEC cannot be understood purely 
by lining up in parallel revelations from the study of France, Germany, and every 
other EEC member state.  Instead the interplay between each national policy as well 
as the extra input of the Community institutions themselves need to be added to the 
historical analysis.   
This is not, of course, the same as asserting that national actions or national 
interest ceased to be relevant in Community Europe and that all could be understood 
merely by scrutinising the policy and motives of the European Commission.  To do 
this would be to repeat the mistakes of a generation of over-enthusiastic US political 
scientists whose better judgement was swept away in their excitement at, and 
fascination in, the operation of early supranational Europe – and who then had time to 
34 On France and Germany see, e.g., Ulrich Lappenküper, Deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949-
1963, (Munchen: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001); Georges-Henri Soutou, L’alliance incertaine. Les 
rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996); Marie-Thérèse 
Bitsch (ed.), Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2001); 
on Anglo-German: Martin Schaad, Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European 
Integration, 1955-1961 (London: Macmillan, 2000); on Anglo-French: Sabine Marie Decup, France-
Angleterre: les relations militaires de 1945 à 1962 (Paris: Economica, 1998); on Italian-French: Bruna 
Bagnato, Storia di un’illusione europea. Il progetto di Unione Doganale italo-francese (London: 
Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); on Dutch-German: Friso Wielenga (ed.), Nachbarn: Niederländer 
und Deutsche und die Europäische Einigung (Bonn: Niederländische Botschaft, Presse- und 
Kulturabteilung, 1997) 
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repent at their leisure once the experiment seemingly diverged from their expectations 
from the late 1960s onwards.35  For this reason, the gradual emergence of a serious 
historical literature on the early European institutions, while very useful and overdue, 
cannot of itself plug the gap.36 Nor can the fascinating official history of the ECSC 
suffice, given the way in which that body ceased to be the principal locus of the 
integration process from 1958 onwards.37 
Rather it is to argue that the European Community of the 1960s – much as the 
European Union of today – was a hybrid system in which national interest was very 
much alive but was worked out in a setting where compromise with other competing 
national interests was essential and where the views and influence of supranational 
actors like the European Commission or the European Court of Justice were also of 
importance in determining the eventual outcome.  As a result, the historian seeking to 
understand the way in which the system functioned must be prepared to work in as 
35 The early neo-functional works include: Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and 
Economic Foreces, 1950-57 (London: Stevens and Son, 1958); Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics 
of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); ibid. ‘Decision-
Making and Integration in the European Community’, International Organization, vol. 19, no. 1, 1965; 
Scheingold, The Rule of Law 
36 See e.g. Erk Volkmar Heyen, Die Anfänge der Verwaltung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1992); Wilfried Loth, Marie-Thèrese Bitsch & Raymond Poidevin (eds.), Institutions 
européennes et identités européennes (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998); Felice Dassetto & Michel Dumoulin 
(eds.), Naissance et développement de l’information européenne (Berne: Peter Lang, 1993); Véronique 
Dimier, ‘Leadership et institutionalisation au sein de la Commission Européenne : le cas de la 
Direction Générale Développement, 1958-1975’, Sciences de la Société, n°53, 2001 
37 Raymond Poidevin & Dirk Spierenburg, Histoire de la Haute Autorité de la Communauté 
Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier: une experience supranationale (Brussels: Bruylant, 1993) 
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multinational and supranational a setting as the politicians and civil servants who 
populated Community Brussels of the 1960s. 
 In practice this means using the historical archives of both the European 
institutions themselves and those of the individual member states. The methodology 
used in this book is therefore to start with scrutiny of the supranational records 
(especially the detailed records of Council discussions held in the Council of 
Ministers archive in Brussels) in order to establish how collective European decisions 
were taken, before then going back to the principal member states so as to determine 
why each national delegation acted as they did.  The various national archives 
themselves also of course contain much information about what happened in Brussels.  
Each delegation, after all, tended to report back to their national capital, setting out 
what had happened and making their predictions about where discussions à Six were 
likely to go next.  These national accounts thus form a useful complement to the 
official Council minutes and the Commission records of debates amongst the 
permanent representatives.  But in most cases they lack either the level of detail or the 
neutrality of the Council records in particular.  Where the national records come into 
their own, by contrast, is in their coverage of internal policy debate within each 
member state and of the bilateral diplomacy away from Brussels that happened in 
parallel to the multilateral discussions within the EEC institutions.  Since both of 
these often mattered greatly, the national collections of the French, the Germans, the 
Italians and the Dutch are crucial archival components of the research that has gone 
into this book. 
 In an ideal world, all of the supranational and national collections in the early 
Community would have been used to write the history of the early EEC.  Sadly, 
however, the records of Belgium proved inaccessible, whereas the Italian papers seen 
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were obtained only through the generosity of a friend and fellow-researcher.  This 
book hence draws primarily on the archives of the European Council of Ministers 
(held in Brussels), those of the European Commission, (also in Brussels although 
duplicated in part in Florence), the papers of the Quai d’Orsay, the Service Général de 
Coordination Interministérielle (SGCI) and President Pompidou in France, those of 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Auswärtiges Amt and the 
Bundeskanzleramt in West Germany.  In addition a small number of private 
collections have been used, notably the papers of Emile Noël, the long-standing 
Executive Secretary (later Secretary General) of the European Commission, which are 
preserved in Florence, and those of Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign 
minister for most of the period studied, held at Sciences Po in Paris.  Also vital have 
been the published collections of French and still more German foreign policy 
documents.  And, to provide a useful outside viewpoint, a number of British and 
American documents have also been employed.  The British were not only directly 
interested in Community membership for much of the period surveyed, but were also 
by far the best collectors and recorders of diplomatic gossip in Europe.  The files of 
the Public Record Office in London thus abound in stories told in confidence to 
British representatives by countless politicians and officials from amongst the Six.  
Similarly, the published collection of American documents on Western Europe 
demonstrate the way in which some Europeans, notably from Germany and from the 
Commission, were often more candid in setting out their hopes, fears and motivations 
to their transatlantic allies than they were to their European partners. 
 Naturally any study put together using so wide a variety of national and 
supranational sources will lack some of the detail achievable in more narrowly 
targeted research projects.  Those wanting an in depth explanation of how the 
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European policy of Kurt Georg Kiesinger differed from that of Ludwig Erhard, or a 
lengthy analysis of the influence of internal strife within the Democrazia cristiana on 
the Italian approach to de Gaulle, will have to look elsewhere.  Likewise the decision 
to study all of the key controversies within the EEC between 1963 and 1969 rather 
than concentrating just on the evolution of the CAP or on the Community’s approach 
to the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations means that a certain amount of precise 
information has had to be left out.38  But the comprehensive approach does begin to 
capture the way in which policy was actually made in EEC of the 1960s, with 
multiple national and supranational preoccupations colliding on a panoply of different 
issues, in such a fashion that a Belgian gain at Germany’s expense in one field was 
more often than not matched by a Belgian concession or ‘side-payment’ to Germany 
elsewhere.  Only a broad approach can therefore hope to describe and understand the 
full range of interplay between the multiple actors within the Community system. 
 Furthermore, a comprehensive approach also proves to be the most revealing 
way of analysing the institutional evolution of the EEC in particular.  Many of those 
writing about the way in which the Community’s structures have developed over time 
seem to imply that institutional controversies have been the Leitmotiv of the EEC.  It 
sounds at times, indeed, as if the recent Convention on the future development of the 
EU had been sitting in permanent session ever since January 1958.  In fact, however, 
institutional issues have tended to be approached in a much more pragmatic fashion 
by most of those involved in the Community process.  What individual states and 
38 The only previous historical study to have made use of as many national and Community archival 
sources was focused solely on the emergence of one sectoral policy (albeit the most important). 
Knudsen, ‘Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy’.  There are one or two further 
PhDs in the pipe-line in Florence that also try to trace a single policy area using a broad range of 
national and supranational archives. 
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individual statesmen have been primarily concerned about, more often than not, has 
been the way in which a particular policy might work and hence affect the national 
interests tied up in the Community’s operation.  As a result, the exact power of the 
Commission, or the relationship between the permanent representatives and some of 
the ad hoc committees that proliferated around the Council structure, mattered much 
less than the ability of the institutions to carry out the tasks that the member states 
wanted them to do.  The study of the way in which the EEC worked has thus never 
been possible to separate entirely from the study of what the EEC was intended to do.  
On the contrary, the interweaving of the controversies about the agenda and the 
institutional balance of the Community will be one of the recurrent themes of the 
pages that follow. 
 Over all then this book is intended as an experiment in the writing of 
supranational history.39  Many of the ideas contained within it and some of the overall 
judgements made will doubtless be challenged over time.   And it is certainly not 
intended to displace entirely the national and traditional international histories that 
currently predominate, any more than the existence of a European level of governance 
has replaced either national politics or traditional international diplomacy.  But it does 
reflect a belief that, just as the circumstances of the post-1945 world obliged the 
ruling elites of Western Europe to devise radically new forms of cooperation in order 
to prosper, so too the existence of those new cooperative structures forces some at 
least of the historians of Western Europe to adapt in their turn.  The building of  
supranational Europe deserves a supranational history rather than the simple 
multiplication of national histories. 
39 The first use of this term, to my knowledge, was by Johnny Laursen, ‘Towards a Supranational 
History? Introduction’, Journal of European Integration History, (2002), pp.5-10 
                                                          
